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INTRODUCTION

The United States Declaration of Independence states that “all men .
. . are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.” But
should any such rights extend to nonhuman entities? This paper argues that
a proper allocation of an entity’s rights derives from the entity’s value to
humanity. Part II provides an overview of the history and substance of
1

*

J.D. Candidate 2019, Mitchell Hamline School of Law; B.A. Political Science &
Communications, University of Minnesota, 2012.
1
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ¶ 2 (U.S. 1776).
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natural and legal rights. Part III explores the U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings
with regard to the rights and “personhood” of nonhuman entities,
specifically focusing on corporate and environmental entities. Part IV
proposes a model of rights allocation which applies the legal theories of
corporate rights to environmental entities, taking into account such entities’
value to humanity.
II. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL LANDSCAPE

A. On the Origin of Rights
As the Declaration of Independence recognizes, at the heart of the
question of personhood is the proper allocation and acknowledgment of
attendant rights. Societies throughout history have struggled to determine
who should be granted rights and to what extent. While some governments
have attempted to enumerate prominent rights, the interpretation and
administration of even these enumerated rights have not been without
controversy. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court infamously declared in
Dred Scott v. Sandford “that neither the class of persons who had been
imported as slaves, nor their descendants” had “rights which the white man
was bound to respect.” Upholding a law stating that “no Black or Mulatto
person, or Indian shall be allowed to give evidence in favor of, or against a
white man,” the California Supreme Court held that Chinese Americans
were unable to so testify in court, because they were “inferior, and . . .
incapable of progress or intellectual development beyond a certain point.”
Women, of course, were denied the right to vote in the United States until
1920. In Roe v. Wade, the Court held “that the word ‘person,’ . . . does not
include the unborn.” Other examples abound. However, the resolution of
these questions has always relied fundamentally on the ontological
determination of the origin of such rights.
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

2
3

Id. at ¶ 4.
See, e.g., THOMAS PAINE, Rights of Man (1791), in RIGHTS OF MAN: BEING AN ANSWER

MR. BURKE’S ATTACK ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 10 (Cambridge University Press
2012).
4
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I–X (showing how the United States enumerated several
important rights by promulgating its Bill of Rights).
5
60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
6
People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 405 (1854).
7
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
8
410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
9
See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government,
in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 149 (1660), reprinted in THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE
(1823).
TO
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While the Founding Fathers of the United States looked to a Creator
as the source of a person’s rights, others have found answers elsewhere.
Immanuel Kant postulated that rights derived from reason alone. Thomas
Hobbes surmised that there was such a time in which no rights existed,
except that of an instinctual drive for self-defense. Dating as far back as
antiquity, scholars have fixated extensively on distinguishing between natural
rights—which are innate to a being and cannot be taken away —and legal
rights which are granted by a government and can therefore be rescinded.
The conflict arises, then, when a society is tasked with recognizing,
distributing, safeguarding, and adjudicating such rights. While recognizing
an entity as having some basic level of natural rights provides a starting point,
most metaphysical models impute greater levels of rights to different beings
according to a hierarchy. This differentiation of rights necessarily compels
a society to develop laws to determine what should be done when the rights
of different beings conflict. Within the realm of U.S. jurisprudence, three
“levels” of legal rights have emerged—standing, due process, and juridical
freedoms.
10

11

12

13
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B.

Legal Rights
1.

Standing

Fundamental to all other legal rights is the legal right of standing. A
threshold issue requisite to all legal cases, the term “standing” refers to “[a]
10

See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ¶ 2 (U.S. 1776).
See, e.g., PAINE, supra note 3.
12
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (1781), reprinted in THE CAMBRIDGE
11

EDITION OF THE WORKS OF IMMANUEL KANT (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood eds., trans.)
(1998).
13
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: OR THE MATTER, FORME, & POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVILL, 79–87 (1651).
14
See the Declaration of Independence’s assertion that people are created with “certain
unalienable Rights” including “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ¶ 2 (U.S. 1776).
15
See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA: TREATISE ON LAW QUESTIONS 90–
97 (1485); JOHN LOCKE, Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil
Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1660), reprinted in THE WORKS OF
JOHN LOCKE (1823); THOMAS PAINE, Rights of Man (1791), in RIGHTS OF MAN: BEING AN
ANSWER TO MR. BURKE’S ATTACK ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (Cambridge Univ. Press
2012).
16
See,
e.g.,
Great
Chain
of
Being,
ENCYC.
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Great-Chain-of-Being [https://perma.cc/M4NW-N5LJ].
17
For example, the rights of one person versus another, adults versus children, or humans
versus animals.
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party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or
right.” Because standing is a legal prerequisite to any legal action, standing
determines whether an entity will have the opportunity to seek legal
recourse for rights violations in the first place.
The basis for this threshold right derives from the “case or
controversy” clause in Article III of the U.S. Constitution. In the interest
of maintaining a separation of powers among governmental branches and
system of intergovernmental checks and balances, the Court has determined
that it must self-moderate the span of cases it can hear. Additionally,
because judicial decisions are typically long-held through the doctrine of
stare decisis, courts have an interest in ensuring that cases are brought by
the parties with the greatest stake in the outcome of the case, and therefore
that fervent argument ensues.
To acquire standing, a litigant must show three essential elements: (1)
an injury-in-fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the
defendant’s conduct, and (3) a likelihood of redressability by the relief
requested. The first element, injury-in-fact, refers to the invasion of a legally
protected interest. Such an injury must be concrete and personal rather
18

19

20
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24

25

18
19

Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
See id.

20

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;— between
a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens
of the same State claims Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, and
the Citizen thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

Id.
21

See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198–99 (1962) (explaining the Court’s nonjusticiability
requirements preventing the Court from determining a case).
22
A term which literally means “to stand by things decided” and denotes the proposition that
“a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.”
Stare decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
23
See Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1979) (“[A] plaintiff may
still lack standing under the prudential principles by which the judiciary seeks to avoid
deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated
and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular
claim.”); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99–100 (1968).
24
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
25
Id. at 560.
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than abstract and must be actual and imminent—not hypothetical. As the
Court explained, “[t]he plaintiff must show that he ‘has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the
challenged official conduct.”
The second element necessary to gain standing requires a plaintiff to
show a causal connection between his injury and the defendant’s conduct.
The injury must be “fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful
conduct.” Further, the injury cannot be the result of a third party’s
intervening action. Applying this reasoning, the Court held that plaintiffs
lacked standing to challenge federal funding of an overseas dam building
project that had the potential to harm endangered species, because other
countries were funding the project as well. These foreign countries were
therefore intermediaries, breaking the line of causation to the defendant.
Finally, for the third element of standing, a litigant must show that the
relief he has requested is likely to redress his injury and not merely
speculative. For example, in Linda R.S. v. Richard D., the Court found that
a plaintiff had established injury-in-fact and causation, but nevertheless
dismissed the plaintiff’s challenge to a district attorney’s refusal to enforce
the payment of child support. The Court reasoned that the relief requested
by the plaintiff (enforcement of a child support order) was unlikely to
remedy her injury because the penalty for the defendant’s failure to pay the
support was incarceration—a consequence which would not bring the
26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

26

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753–56 (1984). In this case, the Court held that the
respondents, parents of black children enrolled in schools undergoing desegregation, did not
have standing to sue the Internal Revenue Service for failing to withhold tax-exempt status
from racially discriminatory schools. Id. at 753. The Court reasoned that the illegal actions
of the government and the stigma the children faced due to generalized racist practices were
not sufficiently concrete and personal so as to satisfy the first element of standing. Id. at 756.
27
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983) (holding that respondent did not have
standing to seek an injunction prohibiting police officers in the City of Los Angeles,
California, from utilizing chokeholds when apprehending non-violent suspects because the
respondent could not show he was going to be placed in a chokehold by Los Angeles police
in the future). Notably, Justice Thurgood Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, took a more
functional approach to standing, arguing that if Lyons, an African American man who was
gravely harmed after being placed in a chokehold by Los Angeles police, couldn’t bring this
suit, then no one could. Id. at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
28
Id. at 101–02 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
29
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
30
Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
31
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
32
Id. at 571.
33
Id. at 562.
34
Id. at 561.
35
410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
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plaintiff any closer to obtaining child support payments. Therefore, an
entity seeking to obtain standing to pursue a legal case must show “a direct
nexus between the vindication of her interest and the enforcement of the
[requested relief].” Notably, even small or incremental steps toward the
advancement of a remedy are sufficient to meet the redressability
requirement.
While these standing requirements apply to most cases, there are some
special circumstances under which the requirements are relaxed or altered.
For example, many statutes include “citizen suit provisions” which
preemptively grant private citizens the right to bring suits against violators of
the statute or government agencies that fail to discharge a non-discretionary
duty required under the statute. Additionally, under the doctrine of
“associational standing,” an association can bring a lawsuit on behalf of its
members if it meets three conditions: (1) its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right, (2) the interests at stake are germane to
the organization’s purpose, and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested require the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.
Third, under the doctrine of “special solicitude,” U.S. states bringing suit
on their own behalf are entitled to special consideration and flexibility from
typical standing requirements and need only prove that there is some
possibility, rather than a likelihood, that the relief they request will advance
the remedy sought. This consideration is given in light of the particular
need that states have to protect their quasi-sovereign interests. Fourth is a
narrow exception to the general prohibition on taxpayer standing, which
ordinarily prevents a plaintiff from utilizing only their status as a taxpayer to
gain standing. The exception allows taxpayers to challenge federal
36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

36

Id. at 618.
Id. at 619.
38
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007) (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of
37

Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1995) (“[A] reform may take one step at a time, addressing
itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.”) in holding
that the regulation of carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles was sufficiently poised
to advance the cause of slowing global warming to merit the grant of standing).
39
See 11 FED. PROC., L. ED. § 32:119, Westlaw (database updated September 2019).
Examples include provisions found in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6972 (2019), the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42
U.S.C. § 11046 (2019), and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2019).
40
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000) (citing Hunt
v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
41
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518–20 (2007).
42
Id. at 520.
43
See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 172 (1974) (citing Frothingham v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)). This prohibition is also called the prohibition against “generalized
grievances.” Id. at 174.
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expenditures when their status as a taxpayer enables them to demonstrate
that they have a personal stake in the controversy and a specific
constitutional infringement. Finally, while standing requirements generally
prohibit a litigant from bringing a claim on behalf of a third party, courts
may allow such third-party standing when a litigant can show that his
relationship with the third party is inextricably bound and that the third party
has a genuine obstacle to asserting his own rights. Outside of these
exceptions, however, the Lujan requirements remain the default
prerequisites for an entity to gain standing.
44

45

46

2.

Due Process

Once an entity has established the legal right to be heard by
demonstrating that it has standing, the next level of juridical rights ensures
that sufficient justification is given, and prescribed procedures are
followed, before the entity’s rights can be taken away. This is the doctrine
of due process. Encoded into U.S. jurisprudence by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, due process is defined as “[t]he conduct of legal
proceedings according to established rules and principles for the protection
and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the right to a fair
hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case.” The
attainment of due process rights ensures that an entity will be safeguarded
and obtain redress for unfair encroachment of any underlying rights,
whether natural or otherwise.
47

48

49

50

44

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101–02 (1968). For example, as was elicited in Flast, the
“Taxing and Spending Clause,” which provides, “No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time
to time,” was sufficient for a group of taxpayers to gain standing to challenge federal spending
on textbooks for religious schools. Id. at 106 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7).
45
See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114–16 (1976) (holding that a physician had standing
to challenge a state ban on the use of Medicaid funding for patients to obtain abortions
due to his doctor-patient relationship and patients’ potential concerns for privacy and
short time limitations).
46
See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
47
This right is called “substantive due process.” Due Process, Substantive Due Process,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
48
This right is called “procedural due process.” Due Process, Procedural Due Process,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
49
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“. . . nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
50
Due Process, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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In determining what amount of process is “due” to a particular entity,
courts employ three distinct standards of review. The most rigorous level,
called “strict scrutiny,” applies to controversies involving fundamental
rights or suspect classes of persons. To satisfy strict scrutiny, the
government must show that it has a compelling governmental interest in
restricting a fundamental right or burdening a suspect class, and that it has
utilized the least restrictive mechanism in doing so. Furthermore, courts
will only consider direct and substantial infringements on a right to trigger
heightened judicial scrutiny. Such infringements must typically consist of
an outright ban or significant disincentive to exercising a right. Such a
heightened level of review is very difficult to meet and therefore has proven
to be extremely protective of an entity’s underlying rights.
The second level of review the government may be required to meet
to satisfy due process is called “intermediate scrutiny.” This standard
51

52

53

54

55

56

57

51

The determination of which rights qualify as “fundamental” has largely evolved throughout
United States jurisprudence, but has come to include rights enumerated in the Constitution—
such as the freedom of speech, association, and exercise of religion—as well as interests
“traditionally protected by our society” and “rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people”—such as marriage, privacy, voting, and property ownership. See U.S. CONST.
amend. I; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
52
Suspect classes include distinctions made on the basis of race or nationality. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–
72 (1971) (holding that classifications based on citizenship or alien status are “inherently
suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny”); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192
(1964) (holding that racial classifications are “constitutionally suspect”).
53
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
54
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386–87 (1978).
55
See New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45, 67 (2d
Cir. 2018).
56
See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015) (holding laws banning
gay marriage unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135
S. Ct. 2218, 2226–33 (2015) (holding laws restricting the display of signs based on their
content as unconstitutional); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 745–48 (2007) (overturning school policies that assign students to different schools
based on their race); Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 220 (holding that all racial
classifications, whether intended to benefit or harm minorities, are subject to strict scrutiny);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (holding that burning the United States flag is a
form of speech protected by the First Amendment and thus requires strict scrutiny);
Application of Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 728–29 (1973) (overturning a state law that restricted
non-U.S. citizens from taking the bar exam to obtain certification to practice law); Loving,
388 U.S. at 12 (overturning a ban on interracial marriages); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a ban on the use of, or assistance in
obtaining, birth control for married couples).
57
Intermediate Scrutiny, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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applies to quasi-suspect classes such as restrictions based on gender or a
child’s legitimacy. At this level, the government must prove that it has an
important governmental interest in restricting the entity’s rights and that the
mechanism chosen to do so is substantially related to achieving that
interest.
The final standard of review is called “rational basis review.” This
standard is used for all remaining allegations of rights restrictions and
requires a challenging entity to prove that the government had no legitimate
interest in restricting their rights. In other words, the means chosen to do
so were not rationally related to achieving the interest proffered. At this
level of review, the restriction of rights is typically upheld unless the
government’s action is clearly wrong, arbitrary, or not an exercise of
judgment.
58

59

60

61

62

63

64

3.

Juridical Freedoms

The final level of legal rights recognized in U.S. jurisprudence are the
juridical freedoms granted by our nation’s laws and precedent—many of
which are enumerated in the Constitution. They include the freedoms of
speech and the press; the rights to assemble, exercise religion, bear
65

66

58

67

68

69

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
60
Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (stating “classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”).
61
See Rational-Basis Test, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
62
Questions of legitimacy have largely been interpreted as relating to the states’ traditional
“police” powers—such as the protection of public safety, health, and morals—as well as
virtually any goal that is not constitutionally forbidden. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
32 (1954) (explaining how “[p]ublic safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and
order—these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of
the police power.”). Generally, any conceivable interest is sufficient to meet this prong of the
test, and that interest need not be the government’s actual purpose in enacting the restriction.
See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
63
See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
64
See Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345 (1986); Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185
(1976); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
65
See U.S. CONST. amends. I, II, XV, XIX, XXVI. But see U.S. CONST. amend. IX. (stating
that the enumeration of some rights in the Constitution “shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.”).
66
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
59

67

Id.
Id.
69
Id.
68
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arms, and vote; and the rights to marry, procreate, own property, and
maintain privacy. While this list is only a short iteration of the many rights
the U.S. government grants or recognizes to varying degrees, it demonstrates
the wide variety of freedoms that the United States has deemed necessary
and proper for persons to bear. In returning to our original quandary,
however, we now consider what legal rights—if any—nonhuman entities
within the United States bear.
70

71

72

73

74

75

III. RIGHTS OF NONHUMAN ENTITIES

A. Corporate Rights
U.S. jurisprudence has considered two main theories of corporate
personhood in determining whether corporations have rights: (1) whether
they have rights independently as “persons” and (2) whether their owners’
rights must be imputed to them because the owners act through the
corporation.

1.

Corporate Personhood Prior to Citizens United

“Corporate personhood” refers to the concept that an entity, such as a
corporation, has many or all of the same legally recognized rights and duties
as a human being. While the concept of corporate personhood is now an
accepted notion within U.S. jurisprudence, this was not always so. Questions
about the status and rights of corporations have been raised throughout the
nation’s history. In 1809, one of the earliest cases considering corporate
rights, Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “That invisible, intangible, and artificial
76

77

70

U.S. CONST. amend. II.
See U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXVI.
72
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
73
See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
74
U.S. CONST. amends. X, XIV.
75
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–65 (2003); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); see also U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
76
See Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
77
Of course, many of these questions have been, and continue to be, contentiously
confronted in other countries throughout the world. For example, Marxism brought about a
new understanding of corporate personhood. Marxism recognizes the corporate personhood
of the working classes (the proletariat) while rejecting the corporate personhood of
businesses and individual nation states. See, e.g., KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE
COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (1848). Conversely, historical Fascism opined that citizens
speaking a common language and sharing a national history composed a corporate
personhood, chiefly subsiding in the State. See, e.g., BENITO MUSSOLINI & GIOVANNI
GENTILE, THE DOCTRINE OF FASCISM (1932).
71
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being, that mere legal entity, a corporation aggregate, is certainly not a
citizen; and, consequently, cannot sue or be sued in the courts of the United
States, unless the rights of the members, in this respect, can be exercised in
their corporate name.” In 1819, the Supreme Courtheld that Dartmouth
College, a corporate entity, was entitled to the same Constitutional
protections that individuals enjoy when entering into contracts. In 1886,
the Court considered whether the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment should be applied to railroad corporations.
Reflecting on the case, Justice Black wrote, “this Court . . . decided for the
first time that the word ‘person’ in the amendment did in some instances
include corporations.”
The issue of governmental regulation of corporate spending during
political elections helped define the notion of corporate personhood in the
late twentieth century. In the 1976 case Buckley v. Valeo, the Court held
that bans on corporate expenditures during political elections were
inherently bans on free speech. It admonished, “the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order
to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment.” Two years later, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
the Court provided further foundation for the notion of corporate
personhood when it held that prohibiting corporate campaign contributions
infringed on corporations’ “protected speech in a manner unjustified by a
compelling state interest.” It further opined that political speech is
“indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true
because the speech comes from a corporation.”
However, over a decade later, the Court initiated a complete paradigm
shift regarding its view of corporate personhood. In Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, the Court upheld a state campaign financing law
that prohibited corporations from contributing general treasury finances to
elections. In so doing, the Court determined that corporations were not, in
fact, “persons” protected by the First Amendment. In 2003, the Court
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reinforced Austin’s holding in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,
finding that the regulation of corporate political financing was necessary to
prevent political corruption impairing the public good and democratic
integrity.
Overall, the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the notion of
corporate personhood demonstrate the varying levels of juridical rights
granted to corporations within U.S. jurisprudence. The corporate
protections of the Bellotti and Buckley era shifted dramatically to restrict
corporate personhood in Austin and McConnell and set the stage for the
re-examination of corporate personhood in Citizens United.
88

89

2.

Corporate Personhood in Citizens United

In Citizens United, the Supreme Court was again faced with the
question of corporate rights. Citizens United, a conservative, nonprofit
corporation, challenged Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations
restricting corporate campaign contributions and public distribution of
“electioneering communications.” The corporation had produced a film
prior to the 2008 presidential elections entitled Hillary: The Movie which
portrayed then-Senator Hillary Clinton in a negative light. Citizens United
argued that the laws violated its First Amendment rights by distinguishing
between corporate and individual speakers, and that corporate political
speech was entitled to the same protection as individual speakers’ rights.
The FEC, in defending the regulations, argued that limitations on
corporate speech were necessary to protect citizens from “the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated
with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to
the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” Agreeing that the
regulations were a ban on a fundamental right to corporate free speech, the
Court had to determine whether, under the strict scrutiny standard, the laws
sufficiently furthered a compelling governmental interest and were narrowly
tailored toward that end. Here, the distinction between individuals and
corporations was of central importance. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, stated, “If §441b applied to individuals, no one would believe that
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it is merely a time, place, or manner restriction on speech. Its purpose and
effect are to silence entities whose voices the Government deems to be
suspect.” Furthermore, “wealthy individuals and unincorporated
associations can spend unlimited amounts on independent expenditures . .
. . Yet certain disfavored associations of citizens—those that have taken on
the corporate form—are penalized for engaging in the same political
speech.” Ultimately finding in favor of Citizens United, the Court stated:
By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the
Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the
right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and
respect for the speaker’s voice. The Government may not by these
means deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine
for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration.
The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas
that flow from each.
Therefore, in a complete reversal from the holdings of Austin and
McConnell, Citizens United extended First Amendment protections to
corporations as “persons” entitled to free speech rights.
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3. Corporate Personhood in Hobby Lobby
The Supreme Court recently revisited the notion of corporate
personhood with respect to another First Amendment protection: religious
liberty. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court considered
whether a law requiring corporations to provide its employees with health
insurance coverage for contraceptives violated the First Amendment. The
corporations in this case included several closely held, for-profit companies
owned by individuals whose religious objections to certain contraceptives
conflicted with the law’s requirements. They sought injunctive relief under
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 to enjoin application of the contraceptive
mandate.
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Lower courts that considered the case held that the for-profit
corporations should not be exempted from the law on religious liberty
grounds because their participation in the for-profit marketplace subjected
them to different standards than private citizens. The Third Circuit stated,
“General business corporations do not, separate and apart from the actions
of belief systems of their individual owners or employees, exercise religion.
They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiouslymotivated actions separate and apart from the intention and direction of
their individual actors.” Thus, the Supreme Court was required to
consider whether the personal beliefs of a corporation’s owners could be
imputed to the corporation itself, and therefore, whether religious liberty
protections applied.
Reversing the lower court’s decision and holding for the corporations,
the Supreme Court stated, “Any suggestion that for-profit corporations are
incapable of exercising religion because their purpose is simply to make
money flies in the face of modern corporate law.” Turning to the source
of corporations’ personhood, the Court explained, “Corporations, ‘separate
and apart from’ the human beings who own, run, and are employed by
them, cannot do anything at all.” “When rights, whether constitutional or
statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights
of these people.” Holding the health insurance mandate to be unlawful,
the Court again extended juridical freedoms to corporations pursuant to the
First Amendment. However, this was accomplished on very different
grounds than those in Citizens United and its forbearers. Rather than
granting rights to corporations as attendant to their status as “people,” the
Court based its decision on the desire to protect the rights of the underlying
people who make up corporations.
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apply).
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Environmental Rights

Even on the most basic level, U.S. jurisprudence has declined to grant
environmental entities—natural objects such as trees, mountains, and bodies
of water—any legal rights. In Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme Court
considered a suit by an environmental group seeking an injunction to
prevent the development of a Disney ski resort in Sequoia National Park.
The Court ruled that because the environmental group had failed to
demonstrate a “direct stake in the outcome” of the controversy, it failed to
satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement necessary to gain standing.
Dissenting from this outcome, Justice Douglas opined that
“[c]ontemporary public concern for protecting nature’s ecological
equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing upon environmental
objects to sue for their own preservation.” Likening such suits to other
contexts in which legal standing is conferred upon inanimate objects,
Justice Douglas argued that the environmental “‘aesthetic’ and
‘conservational’ interests [are] sufficiently threatened to satisfy the case-orcontroversy clause,” as required by Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
This call has been echoed by others who similarly argue that natural objects
should be recognized as legal rights holders on their own accord,
empowered with standing to “institute legal actions at [their own] behest.”
The ruling of the Court, however, has maintained that environmental
113
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entities may not bring legal actions—let alone claim other legal rights—
without the intervention of a human being who can demonstrate an invasion
of his rights.
120

C.

Rights of Other Nonhuman Entities

While this paper’s focus is primarily restricted to discussion of
corporate and environmental rights, it is worth noting that courts have also
considered the legal rights of other nonhuman entities within U.S.
jurisprudence. Ships, for example, are treated as separate juridical entities
that can bring suits and face prosecution in their own right. Conversely, as
of yet, courts have not extended legal standing rights to animals. In several
recent cases, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has opined that an animal
could assert standing in its own right, independent from a human being.
In considering a copyright claim brought by a monkey named Naruto who
took a picture of itself, the court wrote:
Naruto’s lack of a next friend does not destroy his standing to sue,
as having a “case or controversy” under Article III of the
Constitution . . . . [T]he court has “broad discretion and need not
appoint a guardian ad litem [or next friend] if it determines the
person is or can be otherwise adequately protected.”
Although the court eventually dismissed Naruto’s claim for lack of
statutory standing under the Copyright Act, it did note that “Naruto’s Article
III standing . . . is not dependent on PETA’s [People for the Ethical
121
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(9th Cir. 1911); Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Tug M/V Ellen S. Bouchard, 377 F. Supp. 3d 230
(S.D.N.Y. 2019).
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Treatment of Animals] sufficiency as a guardian or ‘next friend.’” Although
this language is arguably all dicta and has not been deliberated in the U.S.
Supreme Court, it certainly presents an interesting insight into the current
trajectory of the legal rights of animals.
125

IV. ANALYSIS
Having discussed the historical and legal landscapes surrounding the
notions of corporate and environmental rights, we now turn to an analysis
of the proper allocation and enforcement of these rights. As the proceeding
analysis will show, because corporate rights are the manifestation of human
rights, their allocation and enforcement are inextricably bound to the
existence and enforcement of human rights. Correspondingly, the allocation
and enforcement of environmental rights are likewise inextricable from the
existence and enforcement of human rights. Finally, the precepts behind
state and corporate rights are applicable to the proper allocation and
enforcement of environmental rights.
In proceeding, it is necessary to consider the purpose and end goals of
law. U.S. jurisprudence has expressed that the fundamental ends protected
by bestowing legal rights upon people are to “make men free to develop
their faculties,” respect their dignity and choice, and facilitate the value of
individual self-realization. Therefore, the legal rights due to any single
entity must be considered in relation to, and in proportion to, the ends that
are sought.
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A. Corporate Personhood
The Court’s analysis in Citizens United focused on whether
corporations merited First Amendment protections as “people” in their
own right. Conversely, in Hobby Lobby, the Court extended rights to
corporations not based on the corporations’ own personhood, but rather to
protect the human persons comprising the corporations. In this distinction
lies the key to delineating the proper allocation of corporate rights.
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Corporate Rights Are The Manifestation of Human Rights

“Corporation” is defined as “[a]n entity having authority under law to
act as a single person,” or “a group or succession of persons established in
accordance with legal rules into a legal or juristic person.” The word
“corporation” derives from the Latin “corporare” meaning “combine in one
body.” This characterization of corporations as a conglomeration of
human persons underscores the inherent anthropocentric nature of
corporations. Corporations are man-made entities formed by the law, under
the law. They are developed to fulfill the needs and desires of their human
creators. Therefore, the rights they hold ought to be commensurate to
their nature as such.
As Justice Stevens expressed in his dissent to Citizens United, “The
conceit that corporations must be treated identically to natural persons in
the political sphere is . . . inaccurate . . . . [T]he distinction between
corporate and human speakers is significant. Although they make enormous
contributions to our society, corporations are not actually members of it.”
Continuing, he added, “[C]orporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no
feelings, no thoughts, no desires . . . . [T]hey are not themselves members
of ‘We the People’ by whom and for whom our Constitution was
established.” Extending the title of “personhood” to nonhuman entities
further complicates already-tumultuous debate about what it means to be
human.
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The Existence And Enforcement of Corporate Rights Are
Inextricable From The Existence And Enforcement of Human
Rights

Any time a right is granted to a person or group of people, there is the
potential for conflict with another’s rights. The free press very frequently
leads to an imposition on others’ right to privacy. Property ownership
necessarily precludes the right of others to assemble in certain areas without
permission. Similarly, the right to free speech or free exercise of religion
may very well impede upon another’s ability to exercise their rights fully.
However, the weighing of such rights is precisely what our legal system was
developed to address. These concerns are not limited to the realm of
corporate rights, but rather are concerns addressed daily on the individual
level. In so doing, the U.S. judicial system has established the multi-layered
due process framework for evaluating the level of scrutiny necessary before
an entity’s rights can be said to have been unduly violated. Just as was done
in both Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, courts must balance whether
the alleged rights violation rises to the level of severity requisite for judicial
intervention.
However, a proper balancing first requires an accurate assessment of
the parties involved and consideration of the societal values at stake. In
Citizens United, the Court became swept up in the metaphor of
corporations as people and failed to accurately delineate the true nature and
purpose of corporations. In contrast, the Court in Hobby Lobby accurately
articulated that “the purpose of extending rights to corporations is to protect
the rights of people associated with the corporation, including shareholders,
138
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officers, and employees. Protecting the free-exercise rights of closely held
corporations thus protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and
control them.”
Corporations are not people. They do not derive rights from their own
personhood, but rather merit juridical protection only to the extent that the
rights of the people making up those corporations are threatened. The
decision to operate under the corporate form does not strip any person of
their rights, but rather must be weighed into the balance of the degree of
conflict with other human persons’ rights, the extent of the process due to
such persons, and the end goals of law.
145

B.

Legal Rights of Natural Objects

As indicated by Justice Douglas’ dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton, a
similar debate has been sparked with regard to the legal rights and
“personhood” of natural environmental objects. Legal scholar Christopher
Stone asserts that environmental rights should be analogized to the judicial
rights of corporations. He states, “I am proposing we do the same with
eagles and wilderness areas as we do with copyrighted works, patented
inventions, and privacy: make the violation of rights in them to be a cost by
declaring the ‘pirating’ of them to be the invasion of a property interest.”
To accomplish this vision, Stone suggests instituting a guardianship system,
which would allow “a friend of a natural object [who] perceives it to be
endangered, [to] apply to a court for the creation of a guardianship.” As a
guardian, Stone postulates that a person “would be entitled to raise the
land’s rights in the land’s name, i.e., without having to make the roundabout
and often unavailing demonstration . . . that the ‘rights’ of the club’s
members were being invaded.”
However, as Stone himself admits, there are several acute ontological
problems with this proposal. The old adage that a tree falling alone in the
woods makes no sound is emblematic of the problem elicited by the notion
of environmental rights. If a society were to grant natural objects
independent legal rights, by what mechanism would these rights be asserted,
adjudicated, and enforced? A tree can no more easily issue a summons and
complaint than it can transmit its dying groans, absent a human audience.
How would such a guardian divine the “wants” and “needs” of a natural
146
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object? Surely a forest—could it speak—would protest being burned to the
ground; yet controlled burns have been proven to provide great benefit to
the regeneration and strengthening of forests. Furthermore, a colony of
elm bark beetles wreaking destruction on a forest of Dutch elm trees would
surely wish to raise a case opposing their extermination. Yet presumably the
trees themselves would wish to petition for their own protection. If standing
were granted enabling environmental entities to raise such issues, courts
would inevitably be inundated with cases forcing them to weigh the
competing interests of a multitude of species.
Another complication the notion of environmental rights elicits is the
difficulty of defining the bounds of one environmental entity from another.
How would one delineate a stream, for example, from its source? Courts
have already shown themselves to be ill-disposed toward resolving such
issues as how to define a wetland or at what point a wetland becomes wet
no longer. Furthermore, if a guardian were appointed for one entity and
another guardian for a separate, but connected entity, how would potentially
inconsistent judgments be resolved?
Finally, Stone’s proposal also fails to provide a solution for the
underlying difficulty of asking a court to put a value on environmental
destruction. As Stone himself acknowledges, determining the “fair market
value” for many natural objects is simply not possible. It requires complete
reliance on the subjective values of any given subset of society. Whose
estimation of value should govern? Certainly, a farming community would
weigh the interests of developing cropland over those of preserving a
wetland. The debate over the Keystone XL Pipeline perfectly evidences the
conflicting values held by those whose livelihoods depend on the use of
natural resources versus those who value land for its historical, aesthetic, or
spiritual significance. Moreover, some environmental damages, no matter
the amount of the judgment, are irreversible and can never be “made
whole.”
152

153

154

155

156

157

152

MINN. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., THE BENEFITS OF PRESCRIBED BURNING ON PRIVATE LAND
1
(1994),
https://files.dnr.state.mn.us/assistance/backyard/privatelandsprogram/benefits_prescribed_
burning.pdf [https://perma.cc/63K9-EFN7].
153
See Stone, supra note 114, at 464 n.49.
154
See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 729 (2006).
155
See Stone, supra note 114, at 476.
156
See id. at 478.
157
Jeremy Diamond, Keystone XL Pipeline Debate: What Do I Need to Know?, CNN (Feb.
25,
2015),
https://www.cnn.com/2014/11/18/politics/keystone-pipeline-senate-voteexplainer/index.html [https://perma.cc/955W-EM9G].

150

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1

Stone offers two potential solutions to this issue. First, he suggests that
these problems could be “sidestepped” by “making the ocean whole
somewhere else, in some other way.” By this, he seems to suggest that if
destruction cannot be avoided in one area, then those who wish to utilize
that area must pay to have another area ameliorated somewhere else.
Alternatively, he proposes establishing a “trust fund” subsidized by all
taxpayers and the proceeds of successful environmental suits to address
environmental losses on the whole. This fund, Stone suggests, could also
be used to satisfy judgments against the environment itself inevitably brought
by those who are injured by natural objects, as justice would necessitate.
However, both of these solutions are wrought with impediments.
First, ameliorating the problem elsewhere does not resolve the issue of
competing values at the original site. Telling a Native American tribe that
they can resume their veneration of sacred land at an alternative site is not
bound to end in agreement. Nor can the historical value of a certain area
simply be transplanted elsewhere. Stone’s “sidestepping” solution fails to
address the underlying problems of environmental degradation: Fixing the
environment elsewhere will not result in relief being granted where it is
presently needed.
Secondly, ameliorating the environment elsewhere would entirely
undermine the very notion that Stone proffers—that natural objects are
entitled to legal rights in and of themselves. If cutting down a tree to make
way for a road can be cured by planting a new forest elsewhere, then the
tree itself is not valued or receiving redress. Considerations of
environmental rights necessarily extend beyond the particularized decisions
at individual sites.
Such ontological issues again arise when considering “who” is
responsible for such natural disasters when they occur. As Stone
acknowledges, “when the Nile overflows, is it the ‘responsibility’ of the
river? the mountains? the snow? the hydrological cycle?” And when the
dialogue regarding human-caused climate change is added to the mix, the
allocation of fault becomes Sisyphean. Establishing a taxpayer-funded trust
account places the responsibility on all Americans. Should all of society be
made to pay the price for the destruction wreaked most heavily by the few?
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See id. at 480–81.
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natural objects, such as in cases of trees that fell and killed a person. However, these
judgments consisted of the surrender of the tree to the deceased’s family or the Church,
rather than any monetary award. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 19, 24
(1881).
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Such a proposition certainly smacks of injustice considering the prohibition
on taxpayer standing discussed above. Moreover, as Stone recognizes, the
true costs of environmental degradation are often borne most heavily by the
poor and marginalized in society.
163

164

1.

The Existence And Enforcement of Environmental Rights Are
Inextricable From The Existence And Enforcement of Human
Rights

All of these issues show that considerations of environmental rights are
inextricably entwined with discussions of human values and human rights.
Certainly, protecting the environment is a worthy and vital cause. But
preventing environmental degradation at all costs—up to and including the
165
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See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974); supra Section II.B.1. One
cannot help but wonder if such things do not seem to have an internal justice of their own
and are best relegated to the court of nature itself.
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Stone, supra note 114, at 477 n.87 (“[T]he poor quite possibly will bear the brunt of the
compromises.”). Pope Francis, too, took up this cry in his papal encyclical Laudato Si’ in
which he wrote:
[T]he deterioration of the environment and of society affects the most vulnerable
people on the planet: ‘Both everyday experience and scientific research show that
the gravest effects of all attacks on the environment are suffered by the
poorest.’ For example, the depletion of fishing reserves especially hurts small
fishing communities without the means to replace those resources; water pollution
particularly affects the poor who cannot buy bottled water; and rises in the sea level
mainly affect impoverished coastal populations who have nowhere else to go. The
impact of present imbalances is also seen in the premature death of many of the
poor, in conflicts sparked by the shortage of resources, and in any number of other
problems which are insufficiently represented on global agendas . . . . [W]e have
to realize that a true ecological approach always becomes a social approach; it must
integrate questions of justice in debates on the environment, so as to hear both the
cry of the earth and the cry of the poor.
Pope
Francis,
Laudato
Si’,
¶¶
48–49,
(May
24,
2015),
https://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/pdf/encyclicals/documents/papafrancesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/P43L-6G2X] (quoting
Bolivian Bishops’ Conference, Pastoral Letter on the Environment and Human
Development in Bolivia El universo, don de Dios para la vida 17 (Mar. 23, 2012)).
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See Pope Francis, supra note 165, ¶ 48 at 33 (“The human environment and the natural
environment deteriorate together; we cannot adequately combat environmental
degradation unless we attend to causes related to human and social degradation.”).
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complete erasure of humanity —is not a just and cogent solution. So what
is man to do? Do we forsake our own natural rights to life and liberty for
the sake of the planet on which we find ourselves? Or is there a way to
protect the unique dignity attending our own humanity while also conserving
the environment which enables us to continue living?
The conclusion that these issues demand is that the universe was
created for humanity and finds its destiny in man. Determining the value
of environmental protection is inherently anthropocentric. Any tool
selected will necessarily center on the environment’s value to humankind
rather than any inherent value of the entity in and of itself—whether the
valuation is calculated based on the real estate value of the land, market
value of its resources, or a more elusive societal value in preserving the
environment for unborn generations. As Stone concedes, it is intractable to
suggest “that the mountain, or the planet earth, or the cosmos, is concerned
about whether the pines stand or fall . . . . [T]he cosmos [does not] care if
we humans persist or not.” Therefore, just as in the case of corporate
rights, the concept of environmental rights must be analyzed with a view
toward the protection of human rights and the fulfillment of the end goals
of law.
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The Precepts Behind State And Corporate Rights Are
Applicable To The Allocation And Enforcement of

Indeed, there are those who would call for the total extinction of humanity for the sake of
preserving the environment. For example, the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement has
as its mission, “Phasing out the human race by voluntarily ceasing to breed [to] allow Earth’s
biosphere to return to good health.” Les Knight, THE VOLUNTARY HUMAN EXTINCTION
MOVEMENT, http://vhemt.org/ [https://perma.cc/S2U4-C3NS]. Similarly, there is a growing
movement in which people are choosing not to have children in order to reduce carbon
emissions and the use of resources. See Amy Fleming, Would You Give Up Having
Children to Save the Planet? Meet the Couples Who Have, THE GUARDIAN (June 20, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/20/give-up-having-children-couples-saveplanet-climate-crisis [https://perma.cc/A9UB-LNP5]. Further, the Anti-Natalist movement
espouses a philosophy that the creation of new human life is a negative thing. Its progenitors
point to the suffering that human life involves, both for people themselves and for other
species that suffer because of humans, and suggest that because of such suffering, the
generation of new life should be avoided. See DAVID BENATAR, BETTER NEVER TO HAVE
BEEN 8 (2006).
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Joseph Michalak, Dir. of the Inst. for Diaconate Formation, The Seminaries of Saint Paul,
Address at the Catechetical Institute (February 11, 2018). See also Pope Saint Paul VI,
Lumen
Gentium,
¶
48
(Nov.
21,
1964),
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vatii_const_19641121_lumen-gentium_en.html [https://perma.cc/PQW7-KWKX].
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Environmental Rights
Revisiting the Court’s rationales for imposing standing requirements at
the outset, we must consider whether “granting trees standing” would be in
the best interest of our nation’s traditions of safeguarding the separation of
powers, ensuring checks and balances, and impelling fervent argumentation
by litigants who are in the best position to bring a case. As it currently
stands, the protection of environmental entities is largely delegated to the
individual states and specific federal agencies, such as the Department of
the Interior (DOI) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In
so delegating this power, the Supreme Court referred to the “quasisovereign interests” that states have to protect their citizens and the natural
resources within their borders:
When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of
outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree
to submit to whatever might be done. They did not renounce the
possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of their
still remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to force
is a suit in this court.
However, as many have pointed out, states and agencies often have
many impediments to pursuing actions in protection of environmental
entities. These include a wide array of institutional duties and goals assigned
to them, limited funding, and the conflicts of interest underlying their need
to appease a vast variety of groups and actors. But as the above explication
surveyed, granting natural entities standing to bring cases on their own
behalves is wrought with far too many functional and ontological constraints
to be a feasible solution.
Instead, the concerns underlying the Court’s decision in Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co. to extend a special solicitude to states bringing suits
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See supra Section II.B.1.; United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell,
J., concurring).
170
See Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (holding “the State has an
interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its
domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and
its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (holding
“it must surely be conceded that, if the health and comfort of the inhabitants of a State are
threatened, the State is the proper party to represent and defend them.”); Knight v. United
Land Ass’n, 142 U.S. 161, 181 (1891) (holding “[t]he [S]ecretary [of the Interior] is the
guardian of the people of the United States over the public lands.”).
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Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237.
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Id. (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. at 241).
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See Stone, supra note 114, at 472.
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in protection of natural resources is instructive here. The Court noted the
special consideration that “the question of health [and] the character of the
forests” necessitate in environmental cases. Continuing, the Court stated,
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that
the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by
sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its mountains . . . should
not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of persons
beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should
not be endangered from the same source. If any such demand is
to be enforced this must be . . . .
These same concerns resonate whether the entity bringing the suit is
the state or another interested group or actor. Therefore, extending a special
solicitude to any party wishing to bring a suit in protection of the
environment would seem to warrant these same exigencies,
“notwithstanding the hesitation that we may feel” regarding the particularity
or concreteness of the injury suffered by the plaintiff or the likelihood that
the requested relief will redress the challenged harm. This is not to say that
the claims of environmental advocacy groups should be automatically
assumed meritorious, but rather that in satisfying the traditional standing
requirements needed to simply get in the door of the courtroom, they
should receive relaxed consideration. Rather than requiring members to
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the elements required for
associational standing should be revised in environmental cases to require
only as follows: (1) that the interests at stake in the case are germane to the
organization’s purpose; and (2) and that neither the claim asserted nor the
relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit.
While this solution is not without its own difficulties, the exigency of
our environmental situation and the broad application that environmental
protection has to all Americans—indeed all of humanity—warrants this
conclusion. Taking this incremental step toward environmental
conservation is much more palatable than the dramatic decision to grant
natural entities standing outright. It does not go so far as to extend any
special due process rights or juridical freedoms to environmental entities.
Rather, it merely recognizes the inherent value that all entities—human or
otherwise—have, and because of that value, the natural right to be free from
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wanton destruction. Extending special solicitude to environmental
advocacy groups in environmental cases both protects these natural rights
and promotes the fundamental goals of law.
179

V. CONCLUSION
Corporate and environmental entities have received vastly different
treatment within U.S. jurisprudence regarding the legal rights that have been
extended them. These differences have led to the notion of corporations as
“people,” while environmental entities have been denied even the most
basic level of judicial rights—standing to bring suit. The Supreme Court’s
analysis informing this allocation of rights, however, has been inconsistent
and led to a detrimental understanding of these issues.
Because both corporate and environmental entities derive their value
from their relation to humanity, it is only through this lens that the extension
of legal rights can be properly allocated. The concept of corporate
personhood counterfeits the exclusive stature held by the human person
and has a deleterious effect on society as a whole. While corporations can
be a useful mechanism for humans to achieve their goals and improve
society, they are not people and have no value distinct from the humans
comprising them. Likewise, while protecting the environment is a vital and
necessary cause, it too cannot be evaluated aside from the benefits it
provides to humanity. Granting the environment standing, due process, or
other legal rights is not an effective means of preserving it. Instead, a
loosening of the standing requirements for associational groups to bring
suits on behalf of the environment should be pursued in the interest of
protecting human life and liberty.

179

CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, ¶¶ 339–40 (2d ed.) (“Man must therefore
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beings and their environment . . . . Creatures exist only in dependence on each other, to
complete each other, in the service of each other.”). However, “all men by natural right . . .
, [may use the earth] to sustain and develop life.” Pope Pius XII, Summi Pontificatus, ¶ 38
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